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‘Mucho malo for fascisti’: Languages and Transnational Soldiers 
in the Spanish Civil War 
Maria Thomas (University of Exeter) and Jorge Marco (University of Bath) 
‘Your language does not matter, / for free men speak one language alone. / That 
language alone now matters. / Here you have spoken / in thirty-eight different 
tongues, / but each vibrated with one impulse, / with only one passionate voice, / 
clamorous and pure, / that is the voice of the blood that sings.’1 
‘I hope the next war is in a country where I can speak the language. It makes it so 
much easier’.2 
Traditionally, scholars have addressed the history of war from national 
perspectives. The nation state has regulated the lives of ordinary citizens for 
almost two centuries, something which has had an inevitable influence upon the 
agendas and perspectives of researchers. Until very recently, the transnational 
elements of wartime experiences have received fairly scant attention.  However, 
in recent years accelerating process of globalization and migration have aroused 
an increasing interest in transnational studies, perhaps most notably in the field 
of war and conflict. From this perspective, a growing focus has been placed upon 
transnational soldiers – military conscripts and volunteers whose participation in 
conflict has crossed national, cultural and linguistic boundaries - from the French 
Revolution to the present day. Scholars of transnational soldiers have paid 
particular attention to the paradoxical situation which these soldiers faced in the 
context of modern warfare: thousands of foreign soldiers participated in new 
                                                          
1 L. Pérez Infante, ‘Volunteers for Liberty’, in V. Cunningham, ed., The Penguin Book of Spanish Civil War 
Verse (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), 329-330 
2 Letter from Mito Kruth, 31 October 1937, in L. A. Kirschenbaum, International Communism and the 
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national armies, which were one of the major instruments through which nation-
states strove to ‘nationalise’ populations and forge national citizens. 3 
At the same time, another field of study has emerged over the last decade: 
that of languages in war. British historian Hilary Footitt has led an international 
group of academics who have developed a research agenda structured around the 
role of language in the military field. Working on the period from the nineteenth 
century to the present day, the group has underlined the crucial - and frequently 
overlooked - role played by language intermediaries, language contact, language 
practice and language policy in modern conflicts. 4  Their work is characterised by 
the methodological integration of two disciplines that have traditionally been 
separated from one another: historians, who have paid little attention to aspects 
of language and linguistics, and translation scholars, who have not always 
positioned the linguistic elements of conflicts in their wider historical contexts. 
As Footitt explains, the aim is ‘to see languages as integral to the constitution and 
development of each particular conflict’. 5 
Unfortunately, to date these two approaches have had little contact with 
each other. Studies on transnational soldiers tend to pay scant attention to the 
                                                          
3 N. Arelli and B. Collins, ‘Introduction: Transnational Military Service since the Eighteenth Century’, in 
Transnational Soldiers: Foreign Military Enlistment in the Modern Era, ed. by Nir Arelli and Bruce Collins 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1-12. 
4 H. Footitt and M. Kelly, eds., Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building 
(Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); H. Footitt and M. Kelly, eds., Languages at War: Policies and 
practices of Language Contacts in Conflict (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); H. Footitt and S. 
Tobia, War Talk: Foreign Languages and the British War Effort in Europe, 1940-1947 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); J. Walker and Ch. Declercq, eds., Languages and the First World War: 
Communicating in a Transnational War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), etc. 
5 Languages at War, 3 
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crucial issue of language,6 while studies on languages at war have not sufficiently 
addressed the cultural and identity-related implications of the experience of 
fighting in another country.  However, if scholars wish to analyse in depth the 
linguistic challenges, conflicts, limitations, opportunities and new identities of 
wars with high ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity, it is clear that both of 
these perspectives need to be taken on board.  
In this sense, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) is a perfect setting to study 
the role of language and transnational soldiers in armed conflict, and – more 
broadly – to expand existing understandings of transnational soldiers and the 
languages of war. As well as being a domestic conflict, the civil war was also 
profoundly international. In diplomatic, military and ideological terms, the 
Spanish war was the precursor to the wider conflicts which consumed the 
European continent during the Second World War. Clear evidence of this 
international nature can be seen in the participation of thousands of foreign 
fighters on the battlefield. It is estimated that some 78,000 Italians, 19,000 
Germans, 10,000 Portuguese and a thousand soldiers from other countries, 
alongside around 70,000 Moroccans from the Spanish colonial army, fought for 
the Francoists. 7 While around 2,000 of these soldiers arrived in Spain as 
volunteers, the vast majority were conscripts in their own national armies.8 
                                                          
6 A recent exception: Nir Arelli, From Byron to bin Laden: A History of Foreign War Volunteers 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 161-163 
7 J. Casanova, The Spanish Republic and Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 227 
8 J. Keene, ‘Fighting for God, for Franco and (most of all) for Themselves: Right-Wing Volunteers in the 
Spanish Civil War’, in War Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second 
World War, ed. by  Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 212 
4 
 
In contrast, the transnational soldiers who supported the Second 
Republic’s war effort were practically all volunteers. The Republic’s contingent of 
transnational soldiers, while smaller in size than the rebel one, was characterised 
by far greater linguistic diversity. In total, around 40,000 foreigners from 54 
countries came to Spain to fight fascism. Most of them were soldiers, although 
some also volunteered in medical and auxiliary roles.  By far the largest 
contingent of pro-Republican volunteers was formed by the International 
Brigades (IBs), units of the Republican Army created by the Comintern in 
September 1936 to mobilise volunteers from around the world in support of the 
Republic. Official statistics indicate that between 32,000 and 35,000 foreigners 
belonged to the IBs. 9 Although the exact number of foreign volunteers who 
joined other units of the Republican Army is not known, it is unlikely that they 
numbered more than 3000. Additionally, approximately 4,000 Soviet civilians and 
military personnel were sent by Stalin to Spain to advise the Republican 
military.10 
As a group, these transnational soldiers - many of whom were immigrants 
and political exiles – embodied a cultural hybridity which made them the 
antithesis of the ultranationalist, exclusionary political projects unfolding in 
Franco´s Spain and across Europe. 11 Perhaps the greatest symbol of this hybridity 
can be found in the huge array of languages spoken by the soldiers, who 
                                                          
9 R. Skoutelsky, L’espoir guidait leurs pas. Les volontaires français dans les Brigades internationales, 
1936-1939 (Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1998), 329-330 
10 Y. Rybalkin, Stalin y España: La ayuda militar soviética a la República (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2007), 
114 
11 H. Graham, The War and its Shadow: Spain’s Civil War in Europe’s Long Twentieth Century (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 77, 83.  
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inhabited a space in which more than 30 languages came into contact with each 
other. However, despite the evident importance of language to the military 
organisation and daily experiences of these transnational soldiers, very few 
researchers have addressed the question of the linguistic aspects of the 
Republican war effort. There is an extensive bibliography of studies on foreign 
participation in the war in Spain, and particularly on the IBs. However, a 
widespread tendency to produce case studies of different national groups instead 
of analysing foreign participation as a whole has meant that questions of 
language contact and linguistic exchange have been left largely unexamined.  
In the absence of detailed academic studies on the subject, scattered 
anecdotes contained in chronicles, memoirs and secondary sources tend to 
present two diametrically opposed visions of language contact in the Republican 
war effort: an idealistic image of a ‘polyglot army’12 whose members ‘understand 
each other without needing to speak’13, and another more catastrophist vision, in 
which the transnational soldiers’ chaotic ‘babel of tongues’ 14 led to almost 
complete military inoperability. This article will demonstrate that these two 
representations are, in fact, far from incompatible. On the one hand, the dizzying 
mixture of languages present in the ranks of the Republican war effort, and 
particularly within the IBs, created serious and sometimes dangerous 
communication difficulties. In these circumstances, the IBs’ initial linguistic 
                                                          
12 G. Orwell, ‘As I Please’, Tribune, 15 September 1944 in G. Orwell, Orwell in Spain (London: Penguin, 
2001), 3 
13 Report ‘Casa Verde’, by Gustav Regler, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) F. 545. 
Op. 2. D. 171 
14 R. G. Colodny, The Struggle for Madrid: The Central Epic of the Spanish Conflict, 1936-1937 (New York: 
Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1958), 74. 
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policy, rooted in a utopian, internationalist organisational vision, was abandoned 
by its high command in favour of a more pragmatic approach which improved 
military communication but reduced linguistic diversity within individual 
brigades. Language intermediaries – those who acted both formally and 
informally as translators and interpreters – occupied a crucial place in this 
evolving linguistic policy, and also played a key role in facilitating 
communication between Soviet and Spanish Republican military personnel. In 
this sense, the article highlights the role of translators as 'activists' instead of 
'invisible' actors in the Spanish Republican Army. At the same time, it analyses 
the implications that linguistic policies and language contact had for 
transnational soldiers in terms of identity. At a grassroots level, we argue that 
ordinary soldiers’ daily experiences of language contact and language exchange 
contributed to the forging of new linguistic forms which underlined both a strong 
sense of joint purpose and a shared antifascist identity.  
The article, the first to address the question of language and transnational 
soldiers in the Republican war effort through the systematic study of primary 
material, 15 is based on two main types of primary sources. On the one hand, it 
makes use of reports from the IBs, both from their high command and from 
lower ranking officers in the brigades and battalions. On the other, it uses 
materials produced by the soldiers themselves, either during the civil war (such 
as letters, newspapers and campaign notebooks) or after the conflict (memoir 
sources). This collection of sources has allowed us to analyse the IBs’ language 
                                                          




policies, the language practices and linguistic experiences of language 
intermediaries, and transnational soldiers’ daily experiences of language contact, 
acquisition and exchange.  
Organising the ‘Tower of Babel’: Language policy and international 
volunteers 
 The British international brigader Tom Wintringham recalls entering a 
restaurant in Albacete, home of the IBs, in the autumn of 1936 and encountering 
a throng of recently-arrived volunteers who talked ‘all the languages of Europe’ as 
they waited for their midday meal.16  Transnational soldiers brought a linguistic 
symphony to Spain which included, in addition to some 30 European languages, 
others which would have sounded more exotic to Western ears, such as Turkish, 
Arabic, Chinese and Japanese. The heterogeneity of this ‘babel of tongues’ 
embodied the inclusive antifascist ideal which the volunteers had journeyed to 
Spain to fight for. However, it was also a cacophony that provoked such levels of 
confusion and misunderstanding that US brigader Milton Felsen was left 
fantasizing about ‘George Bernard Shaw's dream of an international language’.17 
Indeed, references to the Tower of Babel, a biblical story which outlines the 
divine decision to provoke linguistic disunity in the people of the world, are a 
recurrent feature of the internal reports of the IBs and the memories of the 
volunteers.18 
                                                          
16 T. Wintringham, English Captain (Eastbourne: Faber and Faber, 1939), 25. 
17 M. Felsen, Anti-Warrior: A memoir (Iowa: University of Iowa, 1989), 46 
18 L. longo, Le Brigate Internazionale in Spagna (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1956), 80-81; Report ‘Efemérides 
Noviembre 1936’, RGASPI F. 545. Op. 2. D. 171; G. Sossenko, Aventurero idealista (Cuenca: Universidad 
de Castilla-La Mancha, 2004), 133-134, etc. 
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Organizing this 'Tower of Babel' was not a simple task. Between July and 
September 1936, the transnational soldiers who arrived in Spain had to improvise 
solutions to overcome linguistic barriers. The first foreign volunteers joined the 
workers' militias that emerged after the collapse of the Spanish army provoked by 
the military coup of 17 July 1936. Some of them were emigrants living in Spain, 
but many were young antifascists who were in Barcelona to participate in the 
Popular Olympics that were due to begin on 19 July. In addition, news of the 
situation in Spain spread quickly throughout the world, and new volunteers 
arrived during the weeks following the coup. 19 From the outset, the volunteers 
spoke a wide range of languages, but four were predominant: French, Italian, 
German and Polish. French quickly became the lingua franca among volunteers, 
and between foreigners and Spaniards. This occurred because French was the 
principal international language at the time, and also because most of the early 
volunteers were either French, or emigrants from various countries who had 
moved to live in France before volunteering in Spain.20  
 In general, these early volunteers attempted to organise themselves by 
language and then to join Spanish militia units. However, in practice the small 
numbers of each linguistic group meant that several different nationalities often 
ended up joining together in the same unit. At the end of August 1936, a group of 
Germans formed the Thälmann Centuria in Barcelona. The Centuria then joined 
the Spanish Karl Marx Division and went to fight on the Aragon front. 21 Another 
                                                          
19 Skoutelsky, 34-43 
20 Le Brigate Internazionale in Spagna, 45 




of these early groups was the Gastone Sozzi Centuria, formed in Barcelona on 5 
September and made up of Italian, Polish, French and Spanish volunteers.  In 
Madrid, also in early September, a group of French citizens and Spanish 
emigrants who had been living in France created the Commune of Paris 
Centuria.22 
Faced with communication difficulties posed by their linguistic diversity, 
units containing transnational soldiers employed a series of improvised measures. 
The most basic level of communication was the gesture. Although George Orwell 
did not arrive in Spain until December 1936, his comical anecdote about how he 
managed to build a barricade with three Germans and a Spaniard despite the fact 
that they did not know each other’s languages captures the nature of this 
rudimentary early communication. 23  Military operations, however, required 
more sophisticated communication systems. Transnational soldiers tried to 
improve communication by choosing commanders who spoke more than one 
language. This was the strategy of the Gastone Sozzi Centuria, which was 
commanded by a Catalan captain who spoke in French to the Centuria’s foreign 
soldiers. 24  Another recurrent strategy was to use bilingual volunteers to translate 
orders into several languages.25 This practice – as we will see in the following 
section – did not always facilitate understanding.  Professional, trained 
interpreters were also employed during the period, although their use was most 
                                                          
22 Report ‘Centuria Commune de Paris’, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) F. 545. 
Op. 2. D. 171 
23 Orwell, 84 
24 Report ‘Primeros polacos en España’ 




widespread within a segregated, elite sector of international participants in the 
Civil War: Soviet personnel who were present in Spain from the summer of 1936 
onwards as advisors to the Spanish military. 
As the number of foreign volunteers arriving in Spain increased, so did the 
linguistic challenges they faced. On 18 September, the Comintern initiated the 
recruitment of young antifascists with military experience to aid the Republican 
war effort, a decision which provoked a new wave of transnational mobilisation 
and the arrival of thousands of volunteers. The first volunteers arrived in 
Albacete, the headquarters of the new ‘International Brigades’ on 13 October. By 
the end of the month, they numbered 3,500. 26 The variety of languages they 
spoke was so wide that one journalist baptised Albacete the 'Babel of the 
Mancha'. 27 The key leaders at the Albacete base were Frenchmen André Marty 
and Vital Gayman (‘Vidal’), Italians Luigi Longo (‘Gallo’) and Giuseppe di Vittorio 
(‘Nicoletti’), Austro Hungarian Jews Manfred Stern (‘Kléber’) and Máté Zalka 
(‘Lukács’), and German Hans Kahle. Most of them were polyglots, although 
among themselves they spoke in French, Spanish and Russian. 28  In fact, many IB 
officers had gained military experience in the Soviet Union and ‘they habitually 
spoke Russian amongst themselves as a lingua franca and to distinguish 
themselves as an elite’. 29 
                                                          
26 Report ‘La Base des Brigades Internationales’, by Vital Gayman, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political 
History (RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 2. D. 32 
27 Ó. Ramírez de Lucas, ‘Babel en la Mancha’, Defensor de Albacete. Diario Republicano de izquierdas, 10 
November 1937 
28 Testimony of Adela Ossart, in: S. Álvarez, Historia política y militar de las Brigadas Internacionales. 
Testimonios y documentos (Madrid: Compañía Literaria, 1996), 287 
29 J. Gurney, Crusade in Spain (Newton Abbot: Readers Union, 1976), 93. 
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The linguistic profiles of most of the foreign volunteers were, however, 
very different from those of their leaders. Russian-born brigadier Alexei Eisner 
describes the bewilderment of the Twelfth Brigade’s transnational soldiers when 
their commander, Luckács, told them he was going to speak to them ‘in the 
language of the October revolution’, that is, in Russian. ‘There were not even 30 
people in the Brigade who could understand him.’30 The volunteers’ 
understanding did not appear to be much better in what was quickly becoming 
the official language of the IBs: French. British Brigader Jason Gurney describes 
his arrival in Barcelona along with hundreds of other international volunteers. 
They were welcomed by André Marty, who 'stood yelling away at us in French, 
which the majority of those present did not understand’.31 
For this reason, as soon as they arrived at the Albacete base, the volunteers 
were grouped together ‘by national affinity or by language'. These groups were, 
according to Gayman, the basis on which the ‘military units’ were built. 32 The IBs 
adopted the structure of the new Ejército Popular which the Republican 
Government began to organise in September 1936, integrating loyal units of the 
existing army and workers' militias into a new ‘People’s Army’. This new army 
was divided into brigades. The brigades were composed of battalions, which 
were, in turn, divided into companies. Over the course of the IBs’ two years of 
organised participation in the Civil War, there were seven International Brigades. 
In this first stage, however, which lasted from October 1936 until March 1937, 
                                                          
30 A. Eisner, La 12ª Brigada Internacional (Valencia: Prometeo, 1972), 74. 
31 Gurney, 54 
32 Report ‘La Base des Brigades Internationales’ 
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only the first five were created: the Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Brigades.  
When Gayman outlined the commanders’ attempts to organise ‘military 
units’ by language and nationality, he was referring to the companies and the 
battalions, not to the brigades. Each of the brigades at this time was composed of 
volunteers from multiple linguistic and national backgrounds. Historians have 
highlighted two factors which conditioned this linguistic organization: (1) the 
precariousness and speed with which the high command had to organise the 
volunteers in October 1936 in order to defend the capital, Madrid, from attack by 
Francoist troops, and (2) the irregular flows of volunteers from different linguistic 
backgrounds who arrived in Spain, which prevented the formation of 
linguistically homogeneous brigades. In this sense, historians have generally 
followed the arguments offered by Longo and Gayman in their reports and 
memoirs.  
There is no doubt that both of these events had an impact on the linguistic 
organisation of the IBs, which existed in a constant state of reorganisation and 
flux determined by the needs of the war and the availability of transnational 
soldiers. However, we argue that, along with these factors, it is also necessary to 
take into account two other key elements that have received less attention: the 
disagreements regarding language policy which took place between the IBs’ 
commanders, and the ways in which the realities of the war modified the 
previously-existent ideas of some leaders, facilitating the gradual implementation 
of changes in the linguistic organisation of military units. Longo and Gayman’s 
13 
 
reports on the formation of the IBs, written months and sometimes even years 
after the events which they describe, are misleading because they obscure these 
discrepancies and construct a more favourable narrative which is coherent with 
the language policies that were implemented in April and August 1937. 
Within the IB high command, there were two fundamental disagreements 
concerning language policy. One was over whether brigades, battalions and 
companies should be linguistically homogeneous, and the other revolved around 
the adoption of an official language. General Kléber was one of the IB leaders 
who, from very early on, defended the need to unite each of the brigades 
linguistically and to promote Spanish as an official language. With a long history 
of military experience, Kléber commanded the IBs at the Battle of Madrid in 
November 1936, where he observed orders becoming ‘distorted in the babel of 
tongues’. 33 The lack of a common language was responsible for 'the difficulty in 
communications between the internationalist commanders or commissars and 
political officers who were also internationalist, and the rank-and-file Spanish 
army members'. 34 
Kléber asked Marty to implement these language policies, but the head of 
the IBs possessed a radically different organisational vision. On 27 November 
1936, Marty wrote a letter to the heads of the International Brigades which 
criticised Kléber's proposal vehemently because ‘our internationals are not bands 
                                                          
33 R. G. Colodny, The Struggle for Madrid: The Central Epic of the Spanish Conflict, 1936-1937 (New York: 
Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1958), 74. 
34 Report ‘An account by M. Fred on work in Spain’, 14 December 1937, in R. Radosh, Mary R. Habeck, 
and G. Sevostianov, eds., Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 345 
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of Landsknecht or Swiss in the armies of European feudalism, but international 
units of the Popular Front’.35 Marty’s linguistic policy was based on political 
rather than military criteria. The IBs should represent the ideal of 
internationalism, and the linguistic unification proposed by Kléber would ‘risk 
breaking the international unity of the brigades’.36 Marty’s utopian vision 
prevailed over that of the more pragmatic Kléber, determining the language 
policy of the IBs between November 1936 and March 1937. 
The triumph of this policy created a situation in which, to quote Kleber 
himself, ‘it is almost impossible to command such brigades’.37 The 
inoperativeness of the military units endangered the IBs’ contribution to the 
Republican war effort. During this first stage, not even the battalions had 
achieved a degree of linguistic homogeneity: in December 1936, the Fourth 
Battalion of the Fourteenth Brigade was composed of 32 different nationalities. 38 
At the end of January 1937, up to 15 different languages were spoken in the Third 
Battalion of the Eleventh Brigade.39  
The definitive proof that this language policy was inoperative in military 
terms was provided by the Battle of Jarama in February 1937. In the newly-created 
Fifteenth Brigade the ‘common language’ was French, a language that neither the 
soldiers, nor the battalion commanders, nor the brigade staff spoke fluently.40 
                                                          
35 Letter from André Marty to the Political Commissars of the XI, XII Brigade and the Base, 27 November 
1936, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 1. D. 42 
36 Ibid 
37 Report ‘An account by M. Fred on work in Spain’, 312 
38 A. Swierczewski, M. Swierczewski and Z. Swierczewski, Soldado de tres ejércitos. Karol Swierczewski, 
General Walter (Madrid: AABI, 2007), 58 
39 Report ‘Informe del Comisariado Militar de las Brigadas Internacionales’ by Luigi Longo, Russian State 
Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 1. D. 2 
40 Gurney, 96-97 
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Russian-born American brigadier George Sossenko describes how orders had to 
be translated orally into six languages, causing misunderstandings and ‘wasting 
time, which is such an important factor on the battlefield’. 41 Consequently, the 
casualty count was very high, something which provoked an atmosphere of near-
mutiny amongst the soldiers.42  
The lessons of the Battle of Jarama led to a change in the direction of the 
Brigades’ language policies. Despite the volunteers’ enormous linguistic diversity, 
it was possible to identify three predominant languages at that time. The Brigade 
commanders began to reorganise the soldiers, moving battalions between 
brigades and attempting to assemble groups of speakers of German (Eleventh 
Brigade), Italian (Twelfth Brigade) and French (Fourteenth Brigade). At the same 
time, a new Brigade which brought together volunteers from Eastern Europe was 
created. Eastern European soldiers were by far the most multilingual members of 
the IBs due to the multi-ethnic nature of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
Russian influence in the region.  It was common for Eastern European volunteers 
to speak at least two languages, which could include German, Romanian, 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, Slovak, Czech, Russian, Polish or Serbo-Croatian.43 At the 
same time, the large numbers of Jewish volunteers who came to Spain from 
Eastern Europe transformed Yiddish into a common language for many 
brigaders.44 This reorganisation ‘would link the international volunteers, as far as 
                                                          
41 Sossenko, 133 
42 Report ‘A Documentary History of the XI International Brigade’, RGASPI. F. 545. Op. 3. D. 471 
43 See, for example, the multilingualism outlined in the personal files of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian 
volunteers: RGASPI. F. 545. Op. 6. D. 339; RGASPI. F. 545. Op. 6. D. 678; RGASPI. F. 545. Op. 6. D. 59a 
44 Graham, 82. 
16 
 
the point of view of languages is concerned,’ Longo reported in a letter to Colonel 
Vicente Rojo, his Spanish superior, in April 1937.45  
At the same time, there was a longstanding debate within the Brigade high 
command over the question of whether to accept Spanish soldiers into 
International Brigade units. Marty argued against possible integration in 
November 1936, citing the Spanish soldiers’ lack of military experience.46 It is 
likely that his position was also driven by other political and cultural motivations. 
On the one hand, the wide ideological diversity of the Spanish soldiers, and the 
presence of anti-communist feelings among anarchists and non-Stalinist 
communists, could have represented - from Marty's perspective - a danger to 
communist hegemony within the IBs. At the same time, his proposal was made in 
a context in which many IB officials displayed contempt, and even ´colonial´ and 
racist attitudes, towards Spanish soldiers. This matter, in fact, became one of the 
main problems in the IBs during 1937 and 1938.47 However, at the end of the 
month, difficulties in recruiting sufficient foreign volunteers led to the 
integration into the IBs of the first battalions formed exclusively by Spaniards. 
However, Spanish and foreign soldiers were still not allowed to form part of the 
same battalions.48  
                                                          
45 Letter from Luigi Longo to Colonel Rojo, 10 April 1937, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History 
(RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 1. D. 17 
46 Letter from André Marty to the Political Commissars of the XI, XII Brigade and the Base, 27 August 
1936, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 1. D. 42 
47 Report ‘An account by M. Fred on work in Spain’, 313, 345; Report from General, Division Commander 
[illegible], November 12, 1937, in Radosh, Spain Betrayed, 260; Report by Arnold Reid title ‘Algunos 
problemas de trabajo del partido en la XV Brigada’, 1 December 1937, Russian State Archive of Socio-
Political History (RGASPI) F. 545. Op. 6. D. 1, etc. 
48 Report ‘Informe del Comisariado Militar de las Brigadas Internacionales’ 
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This policy changed in February 1937, when units containing Spanish and 
foreign soldiers, known as ‘Mixed Battalions’, were organised for the first time. 
The measure was adopted because there were not enough foreign volunteers 
arriving in Spain to fill the battalions, and in the following months it caused a 
radical change in the physiognomy of the IBs. By May, several battalions 
contained between 60 and 70 percent of Spanish soldiers, 49  and by July, 
international volunteers made up just 15 percent of the Eleventh Brigade. 50 This 
new idiomatic composition generated fresh communication problems. On the 
one hand, most of the officers did not know Spanish. On the other, orders were 
issued in the predominant language of each brigade, which was not known to 
most of the new soldiers. 51 
Faced with this situation, in August 1937 Longo proposed the 
‘españolización’ ('Spanishization') of the IBs. His aim was to move existing 
language policy in the direction of bilingualism. The new brigades had to 
combine two official languages: Spanish-German (Eleventh Brigade), Spanish-
Italian (Twelfth Brigade), Spanish-Slavic languages (Thirteenth brigade), 
Spanish-French (Fourteenth brigade) and Spanish-English (Fifteenth Brigade). 52 
By that point, in the absence of foreign volunteers Marty recognised the need to 
integrate Spaniards into the IBs, but considered the Mixed Battalions an error. In 
a meeting with two Soviet advisers at the end of August, he continued to insist 
that, due to Spanish lack of military experience, ‘the intermingling of 
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internationalists with Spaniards in battalions’ should not be allowed. 53 
Nevertheless, Longo’s proposal finally prevailed and the change of language 
policy was carried out. 
In the following months, the International Brigade high command 
attempted to promote Spanish and strengthen it as an official language. As we 
will see in the final section, officers and commissioners were obligated to take 
Spanish classes, while internal bureaucracy increasingly operated in the local 
language. Transnational soldiers, although many were not able to master the 
language, began to communicate with their peers through phrases and keywords 
that allowed them to build a new common language. As Longo explained, the 
military operability of the IBs improved notably as a result of this linguistic 
reorganisation as ‘the barriers constructed by linguistic difficulties start to fall 
down under the weight of the knowledge of Spanish’. 54 Despite these 
improvements, however, over the duration of the IBs’ time in Spain, military 
communication would have been impossible without the work of language 
intermediaries.  
Translating the civil war: the role and experiences of language 
intermediaries  
The development of IBs into an effective, international military force would have 
been impossible without the translation and interpreting work carried out by 
language intermediaries.  These intermediaries included bilingual and polyglot 
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volunteers who entered into formal, semi-formal and sometimes completely 
improvised translation and interpreting arrangements, as well as official, salaried 
interpreters and translators. As this section will demonstrate, their ability to 
move between and among languages transformed them into an indispensable 
element of the Republican war effort. This was true in the case of the IBs, but also 
in that of the roughly 4,000 Soviet military advisors who streamed into Spain 
from the summer of 1936 onwards.  
 The unique circumstances which surrounded the formation of the IBs – namely 
their hasty organization in response to the developing conflict in Spain - meant 
that their interpreting systems and translation practices were developed 
incrementally and ‘on the ground’, rather than forming part of a predetermined 
governmental or state policy.55  Initially, this improvised strategy placed 
multilingual volunteers, rather than professional, trained interpreters, at the 
heart of translation practices. Although the myth of a polyglot army whose 
members were commonly ‘proficient in four or five languages’56 has been an 
enduring one, in reality only a minority of volunteers knew more than one 
language when they arrived in Spain.  Some members of this multilingual 
minority, as Longo indicated in one report, came from privileged academic 
backgrounds, while many came from immigrant families which had conserved 
their language of origin. Others had grown up in bilingual homes with parents 
who spoke different native languages.57  
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At the outset, these polyglot combatants provided a ‘convenient source of 
casual translators’ for battalion and brigade commanders, political commissars 
and Soviet advisors alike. Robert Gladnick, for example, a Russian-born US 
citizen who belonged to the Fifteenth Brigade, and who spoke German and had a 
developing knowledge of Spanish and French, acted initially as an impromptu 
translator to Russian general Dmitrii Grigorevich Pavlov. Similarly, US Finnish 
volunteer Ranse Edward Arvola was occasionally relieved from his ordinary 
duties and summoned to translate for his battalion’s Scandinavian political 
commissar.58 Bernard Knox found himself playing the role of interpreter when his 
group of a dozen British volunteers was assigned to the machine-gun company of 
the French Commune de Paris Battalion – which drilled in French, English and 
sometimes Spanish - in December 1936.59 
These initially informal, improvised translation activities were slowly 
incorporated into more official structures.  Longo revealed that during the 
autumn of 1936, one of the urgent priorities for organisers at the Albacete base 
was to ‘get hold of some typewriters and some translators’ that would enable 
them to ‘find our way around in the language babel of the brigades’.60 He 
subsequently asked for authorisation to ensure that there were sufficient 
translators on his office staff to translate between all the necessary languages.61 
By early 1937, as historian Lisa Kirschenbaum indicates, language skills had 
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become a key requirement for the recruitment of functionaries to the Brigades’ 
corps of administrative staff.62 Gurney explained that by January 1937 there were 
about fifteen interpreters on the Fifteenth Brigade’s staff:  ‘None of them spoke 
less than five languages, some of them working happily in ten’.63 William Rust, 
the Daily Worker’s correspondent in Spain, recalled seeing some of these 
interpreters in action, noting that at meetings of the Brigade’s British Battalion, 
speeches delivered in English were ‘translated sentence by sentence into 
Spanish’.64  
While Gurney was keen to extol the virtues of this ‘outstanding group of 
interpreters’, he also recognised the multiple difficulties faced by them and by 
their colleagues working in other brigades. On the one hand, while the members 
of this polyglot group did enjoy official status as functionaries on the Brigade 
staff, they were also expected to double up as despatch riders, telephonists ‘and 
anything else that was called for around the Brigade Headquarters’, a 
commitment which probably left them with little time to hone their military 
interpreting skills.65  Furthermore, it appears that many of the unit’s hastily-
recruited interpreters actually had ‘only rudimentary knowledge of languages,’ 
and had received no training at all, either in languages or in the complexities of 
written translation and oral interpretation. In Brigade briefings, meetings and 
training sessions, the use of these amateur translators to convey ‘the babel of life 
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and death information’ necessary for effective military organisation could lead to 
significant misunderstandings.66  
In the highly testing circumstances of battle, interpreters’ inexperience 
and dearth of preparation inevitably contributed to confusion and a lack of 
coordination. Gurney explained how word-of-mouth reports transmitted to 
Brigade staff members from the front ‘frequently had to be orally translated into 
three languages without time for careful consideration of their wording. 
Misunderstandings were inevitable and sometimes resulted in absurd and 
impossible orders being conveyed to commanders at the battalion level’.67 In the 
Twelfth Brigade, which contained battalions made up principally of Italian, 
French, German and Polish volunteers, Lukács delivered his commands in 
Russian. These were then translated into French by a staff officer, and 
subsequently translated these into German, Spanish and Italian. ‘Unsurprisingly, 
commands often got muddled in the course of multiple translations.’68 
For interpreters and translators, further difficulties were presented by the 
unfamiliar barrage of military and technical vocabulary which they were called 
upon to translate.69  This problem was by no means restricted to non-professional 
interpreters. Of the 204 interpreters sent to Spain over the course of the war to 
assist Soviet advisors in their communications with Spanish-speaking Republican 
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military units, all had some level of professional training.70  However, some of 
them confessed to finding their assignments extremely challenging. Anna 
Obrucheva, a trained interpreter with native fluency in Spanish who travelled to 
Spain in November 1936 to interpret for Soviet advisor and demolitions expert 
Il’ya Grigoryevich Starinov (‘Rudolf Wolf’), discovered that she ‘didn’t have the 
necessary technical vocabulary’ to explain ‘such things as mines, fuses and 
explosives’ to the Spanish Republican soldiers who Starinov was training in 
sabotage techniques. To make matters worse, the Spanish-language instructions 
for demolition work which she had been supplied with ‘were written very 
formally with a large number of words that were incomprehensible’ to her. 71 
Zakhar Plavskin, who in February 1938 was assigned as interpreter to a Soviet 
advisor attached to a tank division, panicked when he realised that ‘I had no idea 
about vocabulary to do with tanks, either in Spanish or Russian!’ In his first 
attempt to translate a conversation between his superior and a Spanish 
Republican military commander, he provoked generalised confusion and 
palpable irritation by mixing up the Spanish word for ‘crab’ (cangrejo) with a 
term used to describe the underside of a tank.72 
For both Obrucheva and Plavskin, these difficulties were gradually 
ameliorated as they studied the new vocabulary and formed relationships with 
the Spanish military personnel with whom they worked regularly. Many 
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interpreters put together their own dictionaries of military terminology which 
could then be shared with the interpreters who succeeded them in their posts.73 
In Obrucheva’s case, communication was also facilitated by the fact that by 
December 1936, Starinov had become more aware of the value of non-verbal 
communication in his training sessions, and was trying to ‘speak less and show 
more, to have the men practice more’.74  However, wider translation-related 
tensions persisted in the Soviet camp over the course of the USSR’s involvement 
in the conflict. One area of conflict centred on Soviet advisors’ apparent 
incapacity to learn Spanish, something which could provoke the bewilderment 
and even the exasperation of their interpreters. Obrucheva remarked that even 
though Starinov managed to ‘express himself in a kind of Spanish’ with his driver, 
he ‘was just not up to grammar’ and was thus rendered ‘completely deaf and 
dumb’ in her absence.75  
This Soviet linguistic incompetence appears to have been a widespread 
phenomenon:  one 1938 Comintern report lamented that after a year in Spain, 
many Soviet personnel still could not ‘take a single step without a translator’.76  
Another example of this phenomenon can be found in the case of the Latvian-
born colonel Willhelm Ivanonich Kolman, Soviet advisor on the Southern Front. 
Kolman was entirely reliant on not one, but two, interpreters: one Russian-
French and French-Spanish. For Kolman and his Spanish interlocutors, 
conversation was a highly laborious process by which ‘the first interpreter 
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translated his Russian into French, and the second then retranslated the French 
into Spanish’. Spanish communications to Kolman then ‘had to follow the same 
process in reverse’. This generated ‘significant misunderstandings’ as inaccuracies 
were magnified and information distorted as they passed along the impossibly 
clunky translation chain.77  This elaborate procedure understandably exasperated 
Spanish military personnel: Kolman himself explained that ‘just the appearance 
of my guard irritates the front commander, and when I begin discussions, he is 
clearly nervous, tapping the table with his fingers’.78 Indeed, according to 
Obrucheva’s memoirs, Kolman made several attempts to convince her to 
abandon her position with Starinov and come to work as his interpreter instead.79 
It is possible that Kolman’s overtures to Obrucheva were also motivated, 
at least to some degree, by dominant preoccupations in the Soviet camp 
regarding the ‘political unreliability’ of interpreters, particularly those from non-
Soviet backgrounds. One Comintern report from September 1937 warned against 
the dangers of ‘fraternisation’ between advisors and translators, and lamented 
that many ‘internationalist’ translators had not been subject to appropriate 
vetting procedures.80 The attitudes of other Soviet personnel echo these 
suspicions. Plavskin felt that the simple fact of knowing both Spanish and 
Russian made him seem ‘suspicious’ in the eyes of his superiors.81  In March 1937, 
when José Sellés Ogino (nicknamed ‘Chang’), a Spanish Japanese pilot from the 
Abraham Lincoln Brigade, was accused of being a Francoist spy by a political 
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commissar, one Soviet advisor remarked that: ´One needs to take care with 
people who speak many languages.’82  
In the first instance, these suspicions arose in the context of frantic anti-
Trotskyist paranoia which gripped the Soviet Union during the 1930s, and which 
Soviet personnel transferred from the USSR to the Spanish conflict. For this 
reason, the Soviet authorities maintained firm control of the translators at their 
service in order to avoid any ´enemy´ infiltration. Of the 204 translators used by 
the advisors sent from the USSR to Spain, 179 were Soviet citizens, and only 25 
were foreigners.83 The situation within the International Brigades was more 
complex, given that although there was a majority of Communist cadres, there 
were also a significant number of volunteers with other ideologies such as 
socialist, non-Stalinist communist or anarchist.  In this context, the brigaders 
quickly became an object of suspicion to a majority Stalinist leadership.84 
Undoubtedly, language played a central role in the tension between the utopian 
vision of internationalism and the Stalinist fear of the enemy hidden among its 
ranks which pervaded the IB High Command. For this reason, over the course of 
the war, IB leaders reinforced the process of recruiting translators along political 
lines. At the same time, the translators were also an instrument of control of 
foreign volunteers. In this sense, from December of 1936 Longo pressured the 
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Spanish government to establish control over the censorship of the volunteers´ 
letters, in order to identify hidden enemies within their ranks.85 
However, it is clear that suspicions regarding interpreters´ loyalty also 
belong to a wider phenomenon by which wartime interpreters, whose position 
requires them to move ‘between languages and societies’ take on ‘uncanny’ or 
‘quasi-foreign’ identities which cause them to be ‘framed as outsiders, as marginal 
figures’ by those who they work with.86 While the multilingual context of the 
‘babel’ of the Republican war effort undoubtedly softened the edges of these 
perceptions of the ‘otherness’ of language intermediaries to some degree, it 
certainly did not extinguish them altogether.  
It is also important to note that Soviet concerns about ‘political 
unreliability’ revealed an expectation that these interpreters be not only loyal, but 
politically committed as well. In contrast to the now widely-shared conceptions 
of the importance of ‘neutrality’ for interpreters in conflict which arose after 1945, 
the translators who served the Republican war effort – both in the IBs and within 
the Soviet camp – did so from a perspective of ‘activism’ rather than 
‘invisibility’.87 In this context, their work consisted not only of transmitting 
information and commands with accuracy, but also of underlining and 
reinforcing the Republican and antifascist identities they shared with Spanish 
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and foreign combatants. Between classes and operations, for example, Obrucheva 
delighted in being able to translate Stavinov’s tales of Soviet partisan action to 
the sabotage unit’s members, an activity which undoubtedly made both sides 
aware of the commonalities of their shared political struggle and civil-war 
experience.88  
Much like Obrucheva, one Italian interpreter described how the 
experience of translation also enabled him to transmit his own political 
convictions to others. In March 1937, when he was called upon to translate, from 
Italian into French, a welcome speech for new brigade recruits delivered by 
Italian socialist politician Alessandro Bocconi, he recorded that ‘I translate and I 
add something of myself: my emotions.’89 As the next section will indicate, for 
many initially monolingual volunteers who could not serve as language 
intermediaries, language contact and acquisition enabled them to establish and 
reinforce bonds with their Spanish and transnational comrades, allowing them to 
construct new forms of language which underlined their collective antifascist 
identities.  
Language contact, language acquisition and linguistic hybridity: the 
making of a new language? 
For many transnational soldiers, the experience of fighting in a foreign country 
whose inhabitants spoke an unknown language provoked not only 
misunderstanding but also frustration. These sentiments are displayed in 
numerous personal letters written by international volunteers. US volunteer 
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Harry Meloff, answering a friend who had asked him if he had forgotten his 
English after four months in Spain, replied: ‘The truth is I still do not know a 
word in Spanish. The real fact is that there are so many Americans here that the 
Spaniards learn our language faster than we learn theirs.’ 90  
 In the early months of the IBs, foreign volunteers were able to inhabit a 
comfortable ‘international bubble’, leading lives which were isolated from 
Spanish – and Spanish-speaking – reality. However, from the spring of 1937, the 
number of Spanish soldiers in the IBs increased exponentially. By the end of the 
year, one Polish general was describing the volunteers as ‘drowning in a mass of 
Spanish’ and ‘becoming lost in the surrounding Spanish masses’. 91 This new 
situation provoked contradictory feelings which ranged from anxiety to 
enthusiasm. In one letter, the Finnish American brigader Mito Kruth described 
his frustration and the stress of trying to learn Spanish, concluding: ‘I hope the 
next war is in a country where I can speak the language. It makes it so much 
easier’. In contrast, Paul Sigel was excited: ‘We are working with Spanish 
comrades now - really getting an excellent chance to learn the language (…) I 
have been waiting for this for some time.’ 92 
 International volunteers used different informal learning methods to 
acquire Spanish skills, from reading the local press to conversing with native 
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speakers. 93  ‘It's really a lot of fun to learn the language’ explained brigader Cecil 
Cole, who practiced his Spanish by speaking with local people. 94  Sigel explained 
how he and his fellow brigaders ‘roam thru the stores with our English-Spanish 
dictionaries, incoherently mumbling to the storekeeper for awhile [sic], and then, 
of course, assist each other by pointing.’95 However, sometimes Spanish adults 
could be wary of talking to foreigners, something which made it easier to 
establish contact with children, whose nonjudgmental curiosity removed cultural 
barriers. Alfred L. Amery recalls how ‘I began to exercise my Spanish on a roguish 
boy of eleven (...) carrying my small dictionary, I managed by racing through its 
pages to answer questions and made an occasional, very difficult statement'. 96 
 The ‘españolización’ of the IBs from mid-1937 offered volunteers a greater 
variety of formal learning opportunities in Spanish. One of the first initiatives, 
which began in April 1937, was the organisation of meetings at which brigaders 
read Spanish newspapers together ‘to improve the contact between international 
comrades and our new Spanish recruits’. 97 The high command also organised a 
central library and smaller libraries in each of the battalions containing books in 
the IBs’ dominant languages and Spanish materials which served as language-
learning tools. 98  Using these libraries was the method chosen by volunteer Evan 
Shipman, who described his experience in a letter to his friend Ernest 
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Hemingway.99 Some brigades also created cultural activities which facilitated 
language acquisition.  The Fifteenth Brigade organised a group called ‘Equipo XV’ 
to promote knowledge of Spanish, French, English and German through events 
like music and theatre festivals.100 
The most comprehensive language acquisition method designed by the IBs 
were formal Spanish classes. One brigader wrote in his diary that from May 1937 
‘all orders, commands [are] given now in Spanish' in the Abraham Lincoln 
Battalion, so the commissars had to learn a ‘minimum official Spanish to 
understand orders’.101 In October 1937 the obligation to learn Spanish was 
imposed on all political commissars and members of the General Staff of the 
Brigades. 102 This measure was never extended to ordinary soldiers except in the 
case of those who belonged to the Thirteenth Brigade, where learning Spanish 
was compulsory from July 1937. It is possible that this decision was taken because 
the Brigades’ members, who were predominantly multilingual soldiers from 
Eastern European countries, were accustomed to operating in more than one 
language.103 
The rest of the brigades promoted Spanish classes among the 
transnational soldiers, but on a voluntary basis. 104 To facilitate learning, some 
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brigades published materials such as the ‘English-Spanish Grammar’ handbook 
edited by the Fifteenth Brigade in June 1938. The book’s introduction explained 
that: ‘The basic knowledge of Spanish will admittedly eliminate many difficulties 
and problems that arise as a result of the language differences’. 105 Despite these 
multiple opportunities, some volunteers admitted that fluent Spanish continued 
to elude them. Toby Jensky acknowledged that ‘I still do not read Spanish (...) I 
wish I could make myself sit down for an hour a day and study, but there's always 
something more pleasant to do. Maybe some day [sic] soon.’ 106 However, other 
brigaders made an extraordinary effort to study every day in spite of their 
responsibilities and the exhaustion that war brought. ‘It's making my stay here 
very pleasant’, said Alfred Amery. 107 
The degree of linguistic immersion experienced by volunteers was 
determined by individual personality and interest levels, but also by circumstance 
and environment. Finnish American volunteer Bill Aalto initially belonged to the 
IBs and later joined a predominantly Spanish-speaking guerrilla unit within the 
Republican Army. Aalto explained to a friend in July 1938 that he had become so 
immersed in Spanish that his English seemed to be disappearing: ‘How about 
sending some papers or a magazine. I’ve almost forgotten to speak, to write or 
read English.’108 The experience of ‘forgetting’ one’s native language was also 
reported by volunteers from mixed-language or immigrant backgrounds whose 
civil-war experiences brought them into contact with languages they may not 
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usually have spoken on a daily basis. While in Paris on his way to Spain, US 
volunteer William Sennett, the son of Russian Jewish immigrants, wrote: ‘I have 
been trying to talk in so many different languages that by the time I come home 
I’ll be talking broken English. I get along best speaking German. It’s somewhat 
like Yiddish.’109 In a subsequent letter, he explained that: ‘My Jewish comes in 
handy at times (speaking to Germans) but in Spanish I can hardly manage.’110 
In the case of Yiddish-speaking volunteers, this contact with other 
speakers of the language enabled them to reaffirm their identities as Jews but also 
- in a situation where many Yiddish speakers in Spain were refugees from fascist 
and authoritarian regimes - their shared antifascism. According to US volunteer 
Wilfred Mendelson: ‘The real international language here is Yiddish. Jews from 
Germany, France, England, Poland, Czech [sic], Hungary, Rumania, all the front 
ranks of the respective movements have come to battle the common enemy of 
the workers, and of the Jews as special oppressed minority.’111 From the outset 
Yiddish functioned as a Lingua franca within the IBs for Jews from Eastern 
Europe and some western countries, particularly the US.112 As British nurse 
Patience Darton observed, this transformed Yiddish speakers into crucial 
informal language intermediaries: ‘you would always try to get a Jewish person 
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who could speak Yiddish, to another Jewish person – it didn’t matter if they were 
Romanian or Hungarian or what they were, you could get a common language.’113 
Many volunteers reported that, as well as communicating in Yiddish and 
other minority languages, they frequently found themselves speaking a kind of 
hybrid language which contained words and grammatical structures from several 
different languages. Ukrainian-born party organiser Ben Gardner revealed that 
his reaction to the extreme situation of linguistic diversity he encountered in 
Spain was to ‘speak English, Yiddish, Rus. & Spanish combined to some of our 
Internationals. It’s a regular riot.’114  Finnish American volunteer Mito Kruth 
observed that the ‘language’ spoken at the Albacete base appeared to be an 
‘international jargon which slightly resembles French or Spanish.’115 Meanwhile, 
Soviet and Spanish military personnel who worked together closely got used to 
‘speaking a simplified Spanish-Russian argot’ which contained Russified versions 
of Spanish military terms and where all Spanish verbs were employed in the 
infinitive.116 US brigader Harry Fisher recalls that when he was approached by a 
local old man who enquired into how things were progressing at the front, he 
replied: ‘Mucho malo for fascisti’. Despite the fact that he had used three 
different languages (Spanish, English and Italian) and committed two Spanish 
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grammatical errors in a four-word sentence, his interlocutor seemed to 
understand him and ‘hobble[d] away happily.’117 
In this new linguistic environment, where translanguaging was the norm, 
grammatical rules had all but disappeared and new lexical creation was 
commonplace, even the most linguistically unaccomplished were able to engage 
in some level of communication in Spanish. Brigaders incorporated numerous 
Spanish ‘loanwords’ into their everyday vocabularies, developing a kind of ‘trench 
language’ in which Spanish and their native languages intermingled. Letters 
home from the English-speaking members of the Fifteenth Brigade reveal that 
frequently-used military terminology such as ‘enlaces’ (go betweens) ‘pelotón’ 
(squad), ‘cabo’ (corporal), ‘chatos’ (soviet aeroplanes) and ‘golpe de mano’ 
(surprise attack) had become firmly incorporated into soldiers’ daily vocabularies. 
Words which described geographical elements of the battlefield such as ‘sierra’ 
(mountain range), ‘barranco’ (gully) and ‘loma’ (hill) also appeared frequently in 
correspondence. Other Spanish terms which were used so frequently that they 
replaced their English equivalents tended to be either of a practical or 
interpersonal nature: they included ‘amigo’, (friend), ‘sanidad’ (health) ‘ropa’ 
(clothes), ‘garbanzos’ (chickpeas) and ‘fiesta’ (party).118  
By far the most ubiquitous example of transnational soldiers employing a 
Spanish ‘loanword’, however, was ‘¡Salud!’, a greeting which denoted support for 
the Republican Government and which was employed throughout Republican 
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Spain. More than any other word, ‘¡Salud!’ became cemented into international 
volunteers’ collective vocabularies; it was used constantly ‘by persons of all 
nationalities, even when speaking and writing in their own language’.119 When 
writing home, most US brigaders signed off with ‘Salud’.120 Harold Smith reported 
that he was constantly exposed to the greeting: ‘Everyone has his fist in the air 
and you’ll probably “Salud” 100 times a day to 100 different people from kids of 
two up.’121 Canute Frankson, meanwhile, explained that: ‘It is used as a means of 
returning thanks and saying goodby [sic]. The word really seems to adopt an 
historical meaning here in Spain’.122 The term ‘camarada’ (comrade), which was 
sometimes incorrectly masculinized as ‘camarado’, was also used constantly by 
international volunteers, as was ‘no pasarán’ (they shall not pass), a slogan coined 
during the siege of Madrid which became an instant means of communicating 
one’s commitment to the Republican war effort and wider antifascist struggle.123 
The new forms of language being created in Republican Spain were not 
purely verbal. As Smith’s observations reveal, ‘¡Salud!’ was invariably 
accompanied by the clenched-fist salute, an instantly-recognisable symbol of 
antifascist resistance and support for the Republic. These gestures not only 
transcended linguistic boundaries, they formed part of a new, transnational, non-
verbal antifascist vocabulary. In the same way, music provided an instant means 
of affirming shared values and constructing collective identities.  Accounts of 
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international volunteers singing ‘The Internationale’ in a chorus of languages are 
almost as common as references to them greeting one another with ‘¡Salud!’ At 
the end of an IB ceremony held in El Pardo in December 1936, for example, ‘the 
revolutionary songs of each country were sung and the party ended with The 
Internationale, which each volunteer sang in his native language.’124 The German 
writer Alfred Kantorowicz recalled that at the burials of fallen comrades, shared 
singing and gestures engendered an almost overwhelming sense of collective 
belief and purpose: ‘With our fists clenched, in silence and staring at the coffins 
(…) then someone began to sing ‘The Internationale’ and everybody sang in 
German, Spanish, French, English, Italian, Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Yugoslav. 
And at that moment it was like an oath.’125 
Conclusions 
In October 1938 the Republican Government, hoping to spark the multilateral 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain, ordered the disbandment of the 
International Brigades.126 At the farewell ceremony held for the brigaders in 
Barcelona on October 29, US volunteer Mary Colow recalled watching ‘these 
tough Yugoslavs, Germans, Americans’ listening to the final speech delivered by 
Communist politician Dolores Ibárruri. ‘I never had such an experience’, he 
remembered, ‘because these men, such tough fighters, every last one of them was 
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crying’.127 These brigaders, who were listening to a speech delivered in Spanish, 
and who were surrounded by comrades in arms who came from more than 50 
countries and spoke multiple languages, had fought to defend Republican 
democracy in a uniquely diverse linguistic setting which had provoked personal 
confusion and frustration, an well as enormous military challenges. However, the 
transnational, multilingual nature of the Republican war effort had also opened 
doors to new ways of communicating and new forms of language which had 
underlined and helped to forge collective Republican and antifascist identities.   
 Within the International Brigades, the military force which the majority of 
foreign volunteers belonged to, language policy developed in line with the 
changing circumstances of the Republican war effort. The fact that the IBs 
formed part of a revolutionary army which was being rebuilt by the Republic in 
the wake of the military coup meant that its structures and its often-
unconventional policies were in constant evolution. In dealing with the huge 
proliferation of different linguistic groups within the IBs, commanders initially 
based their policies on an internationalist, utopian vision of military organisation 
which called for complete integration between soldiers from different linguistic 
and national backgrounds. However, the military inoperativeness provoked by 
this line of action led the high command to opt for a strategy aimed at bringing 
about greater levels of linguistic homogeneity, namely reorganising battalions 
into clearer linguistic groups and enforcing Spanish as the IBs’ official language.   
                                                          




In spite of the natural difficulties created by operating in such a diverse 
range of languages, the IBs’ commanders were able to overcome the Biblical curse 
of Babel and build an army which was both effective and profoundly 
international. This military effectiveness would have been impossible without the 
work of language intermediaries. Within the IBs, bilingual and polyglot 
volunteers were initially used as interpreters on an ad-hoc, informal basis, but 
formal structures which placed interpreters on the IBs’ official staff were 
established during the first few months of the conflict. The challenges faced by 
these languages intermediaries – from a lack of formal training to the difficulties 
of translating military and technical terms - were manifold and not always 
surmountable. However, much like their counterparts working as interpreters to 
Soviet personnel, their translation activities served not only as a means of 
facilitating communication but also as a way of reinforcing their political 
commitment and underlining their deep implication in the Republican war effort.  
For ordinary volunteers, who were initially bewildered by the extreme 
linguistic diversity of Republican Spain, language also became a means of 
affirming their commitment to the Republican cause and their collective 
antifascist identities. Many soldiers took advantage of informal and formal 
opportunities for language acquisition, something which is demonstrated by the 
ways in which Spanish ‘loanwords’ relating to military, personal and social 
aspects of daily life were incorporated into their native languages. At the same 
time, many soldiers from migrant backgrounds found themselves rediscovering 
or reconnecting with languages spoken by their families. Furthermore, the 
constant contact between multiple languages which characterised the Republican 
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war effort meant that many volunteers reported that they were now 
communicating in a wholly new way which saw words, phrases and grammatical 
structures from a variety of languages intermingling and melding together, 
supported by universally-understood antifascist gestures such as the clenched-fist 
salute.  
This new language, a perfect symbol of the kind of cultural heterogeneity 
and hybridity which the Fascist political projects of interwar Europe sought to 
obliterate, would be used by transnational soldiers long into the future. Although 
some volunteers returned home in October 1938, many stayed on in Spain, 
fighting in different units of the Republican Army. For many volunteers, the 
‘oath’ of commitment to the Republican and antifascist cause described by 
Kantorowicz lasted long after the end of the Civil War. During the Second World 
War, many transnational volunteers, together with their exiled Spanish 
comrades, brought their experiences and identities to the concentration camps 
and the resistance movements of their own and other countries. On the lips of 
these ‘Spanci’, a nickname for former IBs volunteers derived from various Eastern 
European languages, the new hybrid language forged on Spanish soil resounded 
across the mountains, forests and deserts of occupied Europe and North Africa.  
 
 
   
 
